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ABSTRACT 
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act provides that entities covered by 
the Act which receive federal funds are prohibited from discriminating on 
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability. But since the 
provision’s enactment and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices’ promulgation of a regulation creating a private right of action for al-
leged discrimination under the Act, courts have disagreed on whether a 
private right of action exists to enforce Section 1557. This Comment sum-
marizes the courts’ confusion in applying the holding of Alexander v. San-
doval and Chevron deference to the nondiscrimination provision of the 
ACA and concludes federal courts should adopt the approach of the U.S. 
District Court in Rumble v. Fairview Health Services and allow plaintiffs to 
proceed with a private right of action to enforce Section 1557. 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the hundreds of pages of law put forth under the Affordable Care 
Act (“ACA”), a short section serves as one of the most important. Section 
1557 is the nondiscrimination provision of ACA.1 It stipulates that covered 
entities like medical providers, state agencies, and insurance companies re-
ceiving federal funds for health programs are prohibited from discriminat-
ing against patients and beneficiaries on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, sex, age and disability.2 Further, it grants the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) the ability to craft rules in accordance 
with the section.3 
 In 2016, HHS issued regulations pursuant to section 1557 under 45 
C.F.R. § 92 (“final rule”).4 Importantly, the rule asserts a private right of ac-
tion for beneficiaries wishing to bring a lawsuit against covered entities for 
race, sex, age and disability discrimination.5 However, before HHS issued 
the rule, courts struggled to interpret what Congress intended the legal 
rights to be for individuals who faced discrimination or who wanted to 
bring disparate impact claims under section 1557.6 Namely, the courts 
asked how section 1557 incorporates the four listed civil rights statutes 
                                                
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012). 
2 Id. at § 18116(a). 
3 Id. at § 18117. 
4 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31376 (May 18, 2016) (to be codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. § 92). 
5 Id. at § 92.302. 
6 See infra note 9. 
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given the different standards of relief that apply to each statute.7 For exam-
ple, the remedies available for race-based discrimination claims under Title 
VI are different from the remedies available for sex-based discrimination 
claims under Title IX.8 Because of these differences, two recent cases con-
fronted with interpreting section 1557 resulted in opposite outcomes: Rum-
ble v. Fairview Health Services and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporta-
tion Authority v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. ("SEPTA").9  
 Rumble involves a gender discrimination claim brought by a trans-
gender man against a hospital where he sought treatment.10 Using the 
agency deference standards outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. and Skidmore v. Swift & Co. to interpret sec-
tion 1557's incorporation of the four named civil rights statutes, the Rumble 
court denied defendant Fairview's motion to dismiss, and concluded section 
1557 establishes one standard for relief that includes any of the rights and 
remedies available under the named civil rights statutes and their corre-
sponding regulations.11 Thus, a court could grant relief to plaintiffs bringing 
intersectional discrimination claims (i.e., those involving two or more pro-
tected classes) based on any of the standards of relief available under the 
named civil rights statutes.12 Rumble continues to be litigated, but, as dis-
cussed below, the influence of the final rule on the case's outcome is un-
clear.13   
 In SEPTA, plaintiffs brought a 1557 class action discrimination 
claim on the basis of race and disability to contest the price of Hepatitis C 
drugs sold by Gilead.14 Here, the court rejected Rumble's conclusion that the 
standard for relief under section 1557 includes any of the remedies provided 
by the named civil rights statutes, especially for plaintiffs bring 
                                                
7 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012) (listing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(d) et seq. (Title VI), 
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. (Title IX), Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 
U.S.C. 6101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 749 (Section 504)). 
8 See Elizabeth Edwards, et al., Highlights of the Section 1557 Final Rule, NATL. HEALTH L. PROGRAM 
1, 45, 50 (2016), https://www.aahd.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sec1557ACAnondiscrimination- 
NHeLPFinalRuleReview-1.pdf.  
9 See Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 
2015); cf. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Gilead Sci., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
10 Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415 at *1. 
11 Id. at *12 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (hold-
ing courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of the statutes they enforce where congres-
sional intent is ambiguous); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (holding where an agency 
decision does not hold force of law court may determine its persuasiveness with a three part test)). 
12 Id. at 25-33. 
13 See generally Order, Rumble, 2016 BL 281263 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2016) (No. 14-CV-2037) (order-
ing notes to be produced to the plaintiff for the benefit of possible deposition of witness). 
14 SEPTA, 102 F.Supp.3d at 695-96. 
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intersectional claims.15 Instead, the court decided the race and disability 
claims separately.16 Thus, the race claim brought under a disparate impact 
theory failed because the court relied on Alexander v. Sandoval, which held 
that individuals do not have a right of action for disparate impact claims 
under Title VI regulations.17 The court closed SEPTA upon issuing its opin-
ion.18 
 With limited pre-rule guidance from HHS, these cases differ on how 
to incorporate the remedies available to plaintiffs with intersectional dis-
crimination claims in light of the restrictive holding of Sandoval and the 
remedies available under the other named civil rights statutes. Now that 
HHS has promulgated its rule on section 1557, however, this comment ar-
gues that the district court's interpretation of section 1557 in Rumble should 
be the standard used to determine the rights and remedies intended by Con-
gress by deferring to HHS's final rule using the agency deference jurispru-
dence put forth by cases like Chevron and Skidmore.19  
 Part I compares the holding in Sandoval and how its outcome is at 
odds with HHS's creation of a private right of action under any of the listed 
statutes in section 1557. Part II examines the holdings and logic of the 
courts in Rumble and SEPTA related to bringing intersectional discrimina-
tion claims, especially when race-based discrimination claims are brought 
in conjunction with sex, age, or disability claims. Finally, Part III argues 
that the court in Rumble employed proper agency deference to determine 
Congress' intended remedies under section 1557, and thus, its analysis 
should be followed by other courts to grant relief to affected parties.  
I. THE FINAL RULE AT ODDS WITH SANDOVAL 
A. Private Right of Action under Sandoval 
 In Alexander v. Sandoval, the plaintiff brought a class action against 
the Alabama Department of Public Safety to challenge their English-only 
policy for driver's license examinations.20 Plaintiff argued that because the 
                                                
15 Id. at 698-99, n.3. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 701; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 
18 SEPTA, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 688. To the author's knowledge, the plaintiffs in SEPTA have not filed an 
appeal or taken further action since the promulgation of 45 C.F.R. § 92. 
19 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134. 
20 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279. The Supreme Court has not struck down English-only provisions as per se 
discriminatory. As the analysis below shows, because § 601 of Title VI was determined only to apply in 
cases of intentional discrimination, being able to sue under a disparate impact theory on behalf of an 
impacted class (e.g., limited-English proficient persons) would demand that the plaintiff show that the 
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department received federal funds, and thus, is required to comply with fed-
eral law, the English-only policy, though facially neutral, violated Title VI's 
prohibition on national origin discrimination.21 The district court ruled in 
the plaintiff's favor and granted her – and the class she represented – the in-
junctive relief she sought.22 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower court's decision holding that the defendants failed to prove that 
Title VI does not create a private right of action for disparate impact 
claims.23 
1. Supreme Court's Holding in Sandoval 
 Justice Scalia handed down the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in 
April 2001.24 In his opinion, he considered the question of whether there is 
a private cause to enforce the relief regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) under Title VI.25 Title VI section 601 states gener-
ally that programs receiving federal funds are prohibited from discriminat-
ing against beneficiaries of those funds on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin.26 Section 602 allows federal agencies administering such 
programs to issue rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of sec-
tion 601.27 The court previously decided the question of private right of ac-
tion for intentional discrimination claims under section 601 in Cannon v. 
Univ. of Chicago holding that such a right existed under that section.28 
 However, in Sandoval, Justice Scalia concluded that the private right 
of action allowed under section 601 according to Cannon did not extend to 
the plaintiff's disparate impact claim under DOJ's regulations made pursu-
ant to section 602.29 Scalia wrote that the action could only be brought un-
der section 602 if Congress intended to create such a right, but in the ab-
sence of such “rights-creating language” in the statute, he concluded that 
DOJ could not create such a right through its regulations.30 He wrote, “Lan-
guage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress 
                                                                                                             
policy, though facially neutral, resulted in a discriminatory effect against the group she represents. 
21 CARLOS R. SOLTERO, LATINOS AND AMERICAN LAW: LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES 185, 186 
(2006). 
22 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 278.  
25 Id. at 279. 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2012). 
27 Id. 
28 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 725 (1979). 
29 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281. 
30 Id. at 291. 
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through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress 
has not.”31  
2. Sandoval's Application of Chevron and its Effects 
 In effect, Scalia's holding misapplies the deference standard articu-
lated in Chevron that allows courts to look to agency interpretations of stat-
utes to determine the intent of Congress. In Chevron, the Environmental 
Protection Agency was sued based on regulations it created pursuant to the 
Clean Air Act.32 In its opinion, the Supreme Court developed a standard to 
assess the scope of agency power to create regulations based on congres-
sional intent.33 The test states that where Congress has spoken directly on an 
issue, and its intent is clear, then the court should rely on what is written in 
the statute. Alternatively, if the intent is ambiguous or Congress has not 
spoken directly on the issue, courts should defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute as a permissible construction of the statute.34 In Sandoval, 
Scalia saw the lack of “rights-creating language” as an unambiguous sign of 
Congress' intent not to create a private right of action for disparate impact 
cases, which allowed him to avoid deferring to DOJ’s interpretation of Title 
VI in its regulations.35 
 Scalia’s opinion may have been narrow in scope, but it had far-
reaching effects. By not deferring to DOJ’s regulations on Title VI, Sando-
val’s outcome limited the ability of groups experiencing racial discrimina-
tion through facially neutral policies to bring their claims, as Scalia con-
tends, if Congress did not expressly allow such claims. In light of the 
longstanding agency deference precedent established in Chevron, the out-
come of Sandoval continues to confuse courts, because it is inconsistent 
with other Supreme Court interpretations of anti-discrimination regula-
tions.36 Consequently, the holding of Sandoval is odds with HHS’s regula-
tions promulgated according to the ACA’s section 1557, because the final 
rule asserts a private right of action for disparate impact claims under Title 
VI in direct opposition to the holding in Sandoval.37 While the regulations 
seem to allow parties to bring claims under any of the listed statutes in sec-
tion 1557(a), including disparate impact for race-based discrimination 
                                                
31 Id. 
32 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
33 Id. at 842-43. 
34 Id. 
35 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. 
36 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define 
Private Rights of Action, 113 YALE. L.J. 939 (2003). 
37 See infra note 46. 
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claims, the intersectional application of the different remedies has resulted 
in different outcomes in recent litigation.38 
B. Rights and Remedies Authorized by Section 1557 
1. Text and Purpose of Section 1557  
 Section 1557 protects individuals participating in health programs 
and activities that receive federal funds from discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability.39 It is not unlike other 
nondiscrimination provisions in omnibus social services bills such as the 
Food Stamp Act of 1977 or the Fair Housing Act.40 Like those provisions, 
section 1557 invokes protections put in place by Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the cor-
responding regulations based on the agency interpretations of the legisla-
tion.41 
2. HHS’s Interpretation of Section 1557 and Promulgation of the Final Rule 
 In May 2016, HHS issued its final rule on section 1557 under 45 
C.F.R. 92, which came into effect on July 18, 2016.42 To address discrimi-
natory acts and policies, the final rule outlines consequences, like loss of 
federal funding for failing to comply, enforced by HHS's Office of Civil 
Rights (“HHS OCR”) and encourages voluntary actions on behalf of the 
covered entities to address discrimination grievances.43 The rule also asserts 
a private right of action for beneficiaries wishing to bring a lawsuit against 
covered entities for discrimination.44 
 Additionally, commenters hoped the new rule would solve the prob-
lem created by Sandoval, namely, that individuals do not have the right to 
bring disparate impact claims under Title VI.45 In response to these com-
ments, HHS firmly asserted the right of action for individuals to bring civil 
suits against covered entities for intentional discrimination and the disparate 
impact of discriminatory practices or policies.46 This assertion is articulated 
                                                
38 See supra note 9. 
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). 
40 See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(c) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988). 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). 
42 See 45 C.F.R § 92 (2016). 
43 Id. § 92.6 (2016). 
44 Id. § 92.302. 
45 See Edwards, et al., supra note 8. 
46 See 45 C.F.R. at §§ 92.301(b), 92.302(d); see also Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activi-
ties, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,440. 
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in the final rule and in a response to a comment concerning Sandoval’s im-
pact on the ACA's invocation of protections provided by Title VI.47 To that 
end, HHS interprets section 1557 to allow beneficiaries to bring claims un-
der any remedy prescribed for discrimination against the protected classes 
named by the statute, including, contrary to Sandoval, disparate impact 
claims for race, color, and national origin discrimination.48 The regulators 
note, however, that to maintain their current procedural scheme, age dis-
crimination complaints will be handled in a different way from how race, 
color, national origin, sex and disability discrimination complaints are han-
dled.49 Thus, for example, the final rule allows disparate impact claims 
based on race brought under Title VI, but barred by Sandoval, to now be 
brought under Title IX’s anti-discrimination protections, which allow dispa-
rate impact claims, but any intersection with age discrimination would be 
handled according to the Age Discrimination Act.50 
II. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS 
 Since the passage of the ACA in 2010, but prior to the promulgation 
of the final rule, several federal courts across the country encountered the 
question of how to interpret the protections provided in section 1557 in 
light of Sandoval and other cases on agency deference.51 Two cases ana-
lyzed this question on first impression: Rumble v. Fairview Health Services 
and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Gilead Sci-
ences, Inc.52 
A. Rumble v. Fairview Health Services 
 In Rumble, plaintiff alleged gender discrimination under section 
1557 for treatment he received from Fairview Health Services' hospital fa-
cilities and staff (“Fairview”) as a transgender man.53 He went to Fairview’s 
emergency department where his gender identity was questioned by the re-
ceptionist and intake nurse, because it did not match the gender indicated on 
his driver’s permit or past charts.54 Further, he alleged maltreatment from 
attending physicians, insensitivities to his gender expression and privacy, as 
                                                
47 Id. 
48 See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,440 (emphasis added). 
49 Id. at 31,440. 
50 See Edwards, et al., supra note 8, at 10, 24; see also 81 Fed. Reg., at 31,466. The procedural differ-
ences associated with each of the named provisions are outside of the scope of this comment. 
51 See e.g., Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11; SEPTA, 102 F. Supp. 3d 688, 697. 
52 See e.g., Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *9; SEPTA, 102 F. Supp. 3d 688, 687. 
53 Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *1. 
54 Id. at *3. 
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well as receiving paperwork detailing his procedures as “inconsistent with 
[his] gender.”55 Rumble filed a gender discrimination complaint with HHS 
OCR in December 2013 and filed this lawsuit in June 2014 with the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota.56 
1. Judge Nelson’s Interpretation of Section 1557 
 Fundamentally, the parties disagreed on how to incorporate the four 
civil rights statutes into section 1557.57 In her order denying defendant's 
motion to dismiss, Judge Susan Nelson relied on the statutory interpretation 
canons to structure her analysis of what Congress intended the judicial 
remedies to be under section 1557.58 In doing so, she read section 1557(a) 
as a list of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited in a healthcare 
setting.59 However, using the deference test set out by Chevron, Judge Nel-
son determined that section 1557 was ambiguous, because it was unclear 
which standards of the named statutes apply to determine liability, causa-
tion, and the plaintiff's burden of proof, or if transgender people were in-
cluded in the definition of sex.60 
 In light of this ambiguity, Judge Nelson looked to agency guidance 
from HHS OCR to determine what it interpreted section 1557 to include.61 
But at the time the only guidance available to the court was an opinion let-
ter on determining gender discrimination against persons whose gender 
does not conform to stereotypical gender expression.62 Agency opinion let-
ters lack the force of law required by Chevron, but Skidmore allows courts 
to determine the persuasiveness of such letters to guide their interpretation 
of ambiguous statutes.63 The court determined from the persuasiveness of 
the OCR letter that Rumble was protected by section 1557 and could bring 
his claim on the basis of sex discrimination against his “gender identity.”64 
 The court then turned to the question of which rights and remedies 
section 1557 provides to plaintiffs within the protected classes listed in the 
statute. Viewing section 1557 in conjunction with the ACA as a whole, 
Judge Nelson concluded the following: 
                                                
55 Id. at *4-7. 
56 Id. at *7-8. 
57 Id. at *10. 
58 Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *9. 
59 Id. at *10. 
60 Id. at *9-10 (citing Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837). 
61 Id. at *10. 
62 Id. at *10-11. 
63 Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *10 (citing In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 
F.3d 936, 943 (8th Cir. 2007); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
64 Id. 
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It appears that Congress intended to create a new, health-specific anti-
discrimination cause of action that is subject to a singular standard, regardless 
of a plaintiff’s protected class status. Reading Section 1557 otherwise would 
lead to an illogical result, as different enforcement mechanisms and standards 
would apply to a Section 1557 plaintiff  depending on whether the plaintiff’s 
claim is based on her race, sex, age, or disability.65 
 
Judge Nelson continued: 
 
If different standards were applied based on the protected class status of the 
Section 1557 plaintiff, then the courts would have no guidance about what 
standard to apply for […] an intersectional discrimination claim.66 […] Con-
gress also likely intended that the same standard and burden of proof to apply 
[…] regardless of the plaintiff's protected class status. To hold otherwise would 
lead to “patently absurd consequences that Congress could not possibly have 
intended.”67 
 
2. Rumble’s Conclusion 
 As a result of her analysis, Judge Nelson rejected defendant’s mo-
tions to dismiss and found for plaintiff Rumble under section 1557 as it cre-
ated a private right of action to bring discrimination claims under any and 
all of the listed statutes.68 In doing so, she emphasized that this holding does 
not imply that Congress meant to create a new anti-discrimination frame-
work and ignore the jurisprudence of the four listed statutes.69 Instead, her 
opinion reconciles the inconsistent remedies available depending on which 
protected class had been discriminated against, which, if taken individually 
instead of intersectionally, would lead to an absurd result.70 
                                                
65 Id. at *11 (emphasis added). 
66 Id.; see also Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, n.7 (“Intersectional discrimination claims are based on the 
intersectionality of at least two of a plaintiff's protected class statuses.”). For example, a black woman is 
protected by the status of her gender and race simultaneously. 
67 Id. at *12 (citing United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948)). 
68 Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415 at *12. In her rejection of the defendant's motion, Judge Nelson states 
that the court “need not determine the precise standard to apply to Plaintiff's Section 1557 claim.” To the 
author's knowledge, a trial date has been set, and a trial will proceed if defendant's motion to dismiss 
fails. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. at *11 (“[A] plaintiff bringing a Section 1557 race discrimination case could allege only disparate 
treatment, but plaintiffs bringing Section 1557 age, disability, or sex discrimination claims could allege 
disparate treatment or disparate impact.”) (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 (no private right to enforce 
disparate impact claims under Title VI); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act allows for disparate impact claims); Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't., 709 
F.Supp. 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Title IX allows disparate impact claims)).  
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B. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Gilead Sciences, 
Inc.  
 The court in SEPTA disagreed with Judge Nelson's analysis and is-
sued its first impression opinion on section 1557 less than two months after 
the Rumble court.71 Here, plaintiffs alleged defendant Gilead, a pharmaceu-
tical company manufacturing an effective and expensive Hepatitis C drug, 
set its drug prices so high as to create a discriminatory effect on patients 
with disabilities (i.e., Hepatitis C) and racial minorities who are statistically 
more likely to have Hepatitis C.72 The high drug prices, plaintiffs claimed, 
violated section 1557’s prohibition on race and disability discrimination.73  
1. Judge Dalzell’s Interpretation of Section 1557 
 For a first impression analysis, like in Rumble, the court initially 
considers the plain language of the statute, then, if the language is ambigu-
ous, it consults the statute’s legislative history or relevant agency interpreta-
tion for clarity.74 Finding no ambiguities in the language of the statute, 
Judge Stewart Dalzell turned to the question of whether section 1557’s in-
corporation of the four listed civil rights statutes demonstrates Congress’ 
intent to make a single private right – and remedy – available to the pro-
tected classes to bring discrimination claims.75  
 Judge Dalzell determined that section 1557 does create such a 
right.76  However, as to the remedies, the court determined that Congress 
intended to “import the various different standards and burdens of proof 
into a Section 1557 claim, depending upon the protected class at issue.”77 
Thus, the court went on to analyze the plaintiffs’ disability discrimination 
claim and race discrimination claim using two different standards.78 As a 
result, the court determined the plaintiffs’ race-based discrimination claim 
must fail, because Sandoval precludes individuals from bringing disparate 
impact claims under Title VI.79 
                                                
71 See SEPTA, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 688. 
72 Id. at 695. 
73 Id. at 696. 
74 Id. at 697 (citing Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
75 Id. at 698 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286). 
76 SEPTA, 102 F.Supp.3d at 698. 
77 Id. at 698-99 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. at 700-702. 
79 Id. at 701. The disability claim also failed, because the court determined that Plaintiffs did not meet 
their burden of proving their disability. 
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2. SEPTA Compared to Rumble 
 The SEPTA court references the outcome of Rumble in a footnote.80 
It writes, “We do not find that adopting an interpretation of the statute 
whereby standards and burdens change based on a plaintiff's protected class 
status to be patently absurd.”81 The note goes on to conclude that if Con-
gress intended for the same rights and remedies to be available to all of the 
protected classes, it would have simply listed the classes and omitted the 
statutes.82 So, while Judge Dalzell agreed with the court in Rumble that sec-
tion 1557 creates a new, singular cause of action under the ACA, he insisted 
that the rights and remedies available to plaintiffs would be applied depend-
ing on which discrimination claims they brought forth, i.e., sex, race, color, 
national origin, disability or age.83   
III. ACHIEVING CLARITY THROUGH PROPER DEFERENCE 
A. HHS's Endorsement of Rumble 
 As stated in Part I, HHS’s final rule creates a private right of action 
and allows for disparate impact claims.84 In fact, HHS clarified their posi-
tion in a response to a comment on the proposed rule referencing Rumble.85 
In doing so, HHS made it clear that the court in Rumble correctly antici-
pated their interpretation of how section 1557 incorporates the four listed 
statutes and the different rights and remedies they prescribe. That is, indi-
viduals seeking relief under section 1557 may bring their claims under any 
of the statutes listed and, thus, also have the remedies of those statutes ap-
plied to them as well.86  
B. Deference to the Final Rule 
 According to a report by the National Health Law Program 
(“NHeLP”), a healthcare law advocacy and analysis group, the final rule 
“should help ameliorate the access-to-court barriers” that resulted from 
Sandoval.87 This means that courts may see the final rule as effectively re-
                                                
80 Id. at n.3. 
81 SEPTA, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 698 n.3. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 689-99. 
84 See 45 C.F.R. at §§ 92.301(b), 92.302(d); see also Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activi-
ties, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,440. 
85 See 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,439. 
86 Id. (emphasis added). 
87 See Edwards, et al., supra note 8, at 24. 
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jecting the outcome Sandoval by allowing plaintiffs claiming race-based 
discrimination to bring disparate impact litigation under section 1557, be-
cause HHS interprets section 1557 to include the rights and remedies avail-
able under any of the listed statutes.88 NHeLP, like the court in Rumble, 
points out that the regulations do not provide specifics on what the plain-
tiff’s burden of proof is to show intentional discrimination or a disparate 
impact, but speculates that the guidance in the other parts of the regulation 
point to what is required for compliance so a covered entity may avoid the 
potential consequences of non-compliance.89  
 Ultimately, the outcome of a court’s decision on a section 1557 
claim will depend on the level of deference it embraces. A court could con-
clude that because Congress calls on HHS to promulgate rules in accor-
dance with section 1557, it is up to HHS to determine what constitutes 
compliance and, in the event of non-compliance, discrimination.90 A court 
could only come to this conclusion, though, if it employs the test created by 
Chevron, and determines that Congress intended to create a private right of 
action, and the final rule resolves the ambiguity created by the statute.91 
This is precisely what the Rumble court did.92 
C. Ambiguity and Absurdity 
 Despite incorporating “rights-creating language” into section 1557 
by naming the four civil rights statutes, Congress ambiguously left open the 
question of how to apply the rights and remedies of those statutes. Despite 
not being able to defer directly to the rule (as it did not exist), the court in 
Rumble came to the conclusion that HHS eventually codified: namely, that 
section 1557 allows plaintiffs to bring discrimination claims under any of 
the listed statutes, because concluding otherwise would lead to an absurd 
result, especially in the event of intersectional discrimination claims like in 
SEPTA.93  
CONCLUSION 
 Where Congress’ intent to create certain rights or remedies is am-
biguous, adequate deference to agency interpretations may make law en-
                                                
88 See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,440. 
89 See Edwards, et al., supra note 8. 
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(c) (2012); see also Gorod, supra note 36, at 945. 
91 See Gorod, supra note 36, at 945-46. 
92 See Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415 at *9 (citing Lamie, 540 U.S. 526; Chevron, 467 U.S. 837). 
93 Id. at *12. 
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forcement more effective, especially in cases of discrimination.94 Indeed, 
Congress often calls on agencies with their select expertise to determine 
how best to enforce the law and ensure protection of the rights it creates.95 
With that in mind, if Justice Scalia had relied on well-established agency 
deference principles instead of the plain language of the statute, which may 
have lacked “rights-creating language,” but nevertheless created an ambigu-
ity, the outcome of Sandoval may have been different. That is, despite his 
argument that agencies are not permitted to create private rights of action 
where Congress has not expressly created such a right, deference principles 
dictate that agencies are well within their power to expand and define those 
rights.96 Ultimately, in future litigation on section 1557, courts, like in 
Rumble, should defer to HHS’s final rule on the rights and remedies Con-
gress intended to make under the ACA in order for plaintiffs to bring claims 
of intentional discrimination and disparate impact under any of the listed 
statutes against covered entities that receive federal funds. 
                                                
94 See Gorod, supra note 36, at 944. 
95 See Gorod, supra note 36, at 945. 
96 See Gorod, supra note 36, at 946. 
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